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POLICE DISCRETION AND DISCRIMINATORY
ENFORCEMENT
JOSEPH H. TIEGER*
A numbers-runner is arrested for violation of a gambling statute
while a high-stakes poker game at an upper-class gentlemen's club
goes on unmolested. A man with one marijuana cigarette in his
possession is arrested, not because he more than others should be
imprisoned, but simply as an exemplary warning and deterrent to
30,000 other marijuana smokers in the city, and as a token law-and-
order gesture for the rest of the population. A state trooper recognizes
a drunk driver as the son of the president of the local bank and decides
not to arrest him. A corps of building inspectors pore over a print
shop where the local underground newspaper is produced and detect a
violation of an obscure code provision that previously has seldom, if
ever, been enforced. A policeman stops a long-haired youth who is
playing a harmonica in the park and asks him for identification; when
the youth appears arrogant, the policeman arrests him for disorderly
conduct.
These examples depict the reality of law enforcement under our
"government of laws, not men." The reality in the street is one of
discriminatory and selective enforcement. The reali.ty in the
courtroom is not much better. Although the Supreme Court has
stated repeatedly and unequivocally that discriminatory enforcement
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
many state and lower federal courts blandly withhold constitutional
protection of any sort. Indeed, Supreme Court doctrine itself imposes
so heavy a burden of proof that the victim of discriminatory
enforcement rarely finds vindication of his claim in the judicial forum.
The purpose of this article is not to condemn policemen. If it seeks
to condemn anything, its target is the law enforcement system itself,
and ultimately, of course, the society in general. The police
misconduct involved in discriminatory enforcement is not a problem
of stupid or brutal individuals and is not remediable by such solutions
as higher pay for the police.' It is structural, not aberrational, and is
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more nearly inevitable in our legal system than the conventional
wisdom can comfortably concede. Vast discretion, which in practice
is unreviewable, is knowingly conferred on individual policemen.2 The
power to define what conduct shall be criminal is effectively delegated
to the police, 3 enabling them to "do on the domestic level what the
armed forces do on the international level-protect the way of life of
those in power."4
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Police are endowed by our criminal laws with the power to select
from the universe of violators those persons who shall be subject to
the criminal process.5 Given this reality, we are confronted with
questions that challenge the very foundation of our judicial system:
does the customary process by which some are chosen to be arrested
subject certain classes to a penal process from which more favored
classes are, to some extent, exempt? Do denials of due process and
equal protection in that process make a sham of the protections
accorded the arrestees once they are brought to trial? Does
discriminatory enforcement make our criminal system simply another
institution to oppress the disfavored?
The literature of discriminatory law enforcement is to be found
less in the law journals than in the underground newspapers of the
political left.' For the poor, the Black, the culturally-deviant, and the
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1969) [hereinafter cited as J.
Goldstein];
LaFave. The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (2 pts.), 1962 Wisc. L. REv. 104, 179
[hereinafter cited as LaFave];
Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process. 1960 U. ILL. L.F.
481 [hereinafter cited as Remington & Rosenblum];
Comment, The Right to Non-discriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1103 (1961) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement).
2. See, e.g.. Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 11, 26-27 (1962); J. Goldstein; LaFave 119-21.
3. See, e.g., LaFave 122-25; Remington & Rosenblum 494; Remington, The Law Relating
to "'On the Street'" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest
Privileges in General. 51 J. CrIM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 394 (1960); Robinson, Police and Prosecutor
Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda
duestionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply. 1968 DUKE L.J. 425, 502-05.
4. E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 129 (1968). For the statement that the police function is "to
support and enforce the interests of the dominant political, social, and economic interests of the
town, and only incidentally to enforce the law," see A. NIEDERHOFFER. BEHIND THE SHIELD 12
(1967).
5. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 3, at 502-05.
6. See virtually any edition of such papers as The Guardian (published weekly at 197 E. 4th
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politically-activist minorities, constitutional protections are easily
rendered meaningless.by the capricious exercise of unreviewable
discretion by the policeman on the beat, yet most legal scholars are
too dazzled by each successive refinement of courtroom procedures to
even notice.7
Conventional political theory indicates, of course, that our
criminal law, like other laws in our society, are grounded in
democratic processes. Laws prescribing rules by which the citizenry
shall be governed are enacted by legislatures chosen by the people.
The laws are enforced by the police, who perform a ministerial
function-impartially seeking out violations and taking the violators
into custody. In many jurisdictions the theory is articulated in
statutory language imposing upon the police the duty to diligently and
faithfully enforce all the penal laws. 8 If the theory is a political fiction,
St., New York, N.Y.); The Great Speckled Bird (published weekly at P.O. Box 54495, Atlanta,
Ga.); The Protean Radish (published weekly at Box 202, Chapel Hill, N.C.); The Southern
Patriot (published monthly by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, at 3210 W.
Broadway, Louisville, Ky.).
7. Professor Davis offers the following metaphor:
Doing the research needed for a developing legal system may be compared with
keeping in repair an old roof of an enormous building. Our scholarly roof in its present
condition is strange to behQld. Most of it at the rules end is extremely strong, but
portions at the discretion end have rotted away, leaving big holes where the water rushes
in and does great damage. Only an occasional worker gives attention to the big holes,
while the majority of workers swarm over the rules end, stopping or preventing slow
leaks, and reinforcing at points where leaks seem impossible. The reinforcements are
both excessive and spotty. The roof is a hundred feet thick in some spots, but these are the
very spots that attract still more workers. Not much is attempted except patchwork, and
that is one reason the workers ignore the big holes, many of which call for structural
changes requiring architectural imagination. K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE vi-vii
(1969).
8. See, e.g.. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.1752 (1949), stating:
It shall be the duty of the police. . . under the direction of the mayor and chief of police,
and in conformity with the ordinances of the city, and the laws of the state. . . to pursue
and arrest any person fleeing from justice. . . to apprehend any and all persons in the act
of committing any offense against the laws of the state . . . and to take the offender
forthwith before the proper court or magistrate, to be dealt with for'the offense; to make
complaints to the proper officers and magistrates of any person known or believed by
them to be guilty of the violation of the ordinances of the city or the penal laws of the
state; and at all times diligently and faithfully to enforce all such laws ...
Accord, e.g.. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 41, § 98 (1952).
Most police manuals likewise speak in terms of ministerial duty. See J. Goldstein 557-58 nn.
26-27. But cf. L. SCHWARTZ & J. GOLDSTEIN, POLICE GUIDANCE MANUALS: A PHILADELPHIA
MODEL (1968). The continuing validity of the myth of full enforcement may be attributed in
.large measure to the police themselves who "find it easier to answer that they 'enforce the law'
than answer that they must 'select those laws which-are the most important, taking account of
limited enforcement resources' [since] [tihe latter approach may raise legal issues as well as
public relations problems." Remington & Rosenblum 495. See also H. Goldstein 144.
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then it is a legal fiction as well, for many courts have spoken of police
enforcement as a compulsory ministerial act.'
Only recently have legal researchers taken issue with that official
myth and initiated efforts to delineate the extent to which individual
policemen exercise discretion in the process that leads one man into
the courtroom as a criminal defendant and leaves another man
untouched.' 0 It is axiomatic, of course, that our constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection forbid legislative
enactment of criminal laws that invidiously apply only to one class of
persons. It is abundantly clear, however, that there are many
situations in which the legislature gives the policeman the latitude to
do precisely what the legislature is forbidden to do itself. This latitude
is not based on an express statutory grant; on the contrary, statutes
frequently purport to mandate full enforcement of all criminal laws."
Nevertheless, existing side-by-side with these statutory mandates are
other statutes which clearly do not contemplate full enforcement,
statutes proscribing conduct which the legislafure did not intend to be
the subject of enforcement efforts. Such statutes permit the police to
define the actual limits of criminal conduct. 12 Furthermore, because
police departments must allocate their detection and investigation
resources, it is clear that they are not physically able to enforce all
laws with the same intensity. 13 It should be obvious that someone will
9. See Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904,906 n.7 (1962).
10. See THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS (D. Bordua ed. 1967); P. CEVIGNY,
POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY (1969); K. DAVIS, supra note 7; W.
LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUsPEcT INTO CUSTODY (1965); J. SKOLNICK.
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); Barrett, supra
note 2; Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 427 (1960); H.
Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposalfor Improving Police Performance. 65 MICII.
L. REV. 1123 (1967); H. Goldstein; J. Goldstein; Kadish, supra note 9; LaFave; LaFave &
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1965); Reich, Police Questioning oJ Law
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966); Remington & Rosenblum; Robinson. supra note 3;
Note, Kill or be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation. 56 CALIF. L. RhV. 829
(1968); Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been
Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1968).
II. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-75-5 (1963); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 737.11
(1954); note 8 supra.
- 12. "It is well known that some criminal statutes reflect the hope rather than the expectation
that the community will conform to the standard set forth in the statute." Remington &
Rosenblum 493. See also Kadish, supra note 9, at 909.
13. See. e.g., H. Goldstein 142-43; Kadish, supra note 9, at 908-09; Remington. The Role of
Police in a Democratic Society. 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 361. 362 (1965); The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement 1120-2 1.
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set policy for the police department so that some laws are enforced
passively and others actively; 4 the legislatures by default allow these
legislative decisions to be made by the police.
What begins to emerge is a model for law enforcement and police
behavior quite at odds with that implicit in the bare bones of
legislative enactment. A realistic conceptual scheme, at a minimum,
must take into account the following premises: while the legislature
defines the outer limits of proscribed conduct, the police department
defines the actual limits.' 5 Within the actual ,limits, the police
department-or worse, individual policemen--decides which laws
shall be enforced actively and which passively. 6 For those laws that
Iproscribe several distinguishable types of conduct, or restrict the same
conduct in distinguishable situations, the police decide which types
shall be actively or passively enforced. While some situations clearly
require an arrest, others permit or compel the policeman to exercise
discretion to determine whether to arrest or merely to give a warning
or ignore the conduct completely. The individual policeman remains
unfettered in the exercise of this judgment, and no discretion-
narrowing administrative guidelines exist to check his whim,
prejudice, or favoritism. 17
The following figure illustrates a conceptualization of the
enforcement of a broadly drawn penal statute which, as written,
forbids the range of conduct encompassing behavior, let us say, D
through W.
14. See Walton, "Selective Distribution" of Police Patrol Force (pts. I & 2). 49 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 165, 379 (1958).
15. See, e.g., LaFave 108-1 IL.
16. See. e.g.. J. Goldstein 554-62.
17. "There are guidelines for wearing uniforms-but not for how to intervene in a domestic
dispute; for the cleaning of a revolver-but not for when to fire it; for use of departmental
property-but not for whether to break up a sidewalk gathering; for handling stray dogs-but
not for handling field interrogations." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (KERNER COMM'N
REP.) 164 (1968). See, e.g.. Barrett, supra note 2, at 26-27; Foote, Law and Police Practice:
Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 16, 20 (1957); H. Goldstein,- Trial Judges
and the Police. 14 CRIME & DELIN. 14, 19 (1968); H. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1126-28; H.
Goldstein 143; Rotenburg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV.
871, 884 (1963); Note.Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule. 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 158
(1966); Police Discretion and the Judgment that a CQme Has Been Committed. supra note 10.
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D W
(legislatively-defined outer limits)
H S
(administratively-defined actual limits)
H M
(active enforcement)
N S
(passive enforcement)
K P
(routinely arrest)
H J Q S
(discretionary arrest) (discretionary arrest)
D G T W
(not enforced) (not enforced generally, but
selectively enforced)
X z
(arrest for legal conduct-
perjury alleging illegal conduct)
The figure highlights those respects in which actual enforcement
efforts are not constant for the entire range of conduct that the literal
language of the statute purports to render criminal.18 It is possible to
distinguish five types of cases that may arise from enforcement:
I. The administrative exclusion of D-G from enforcement may
18. The figure suggests at least two problems which will not be discussed in this paper: first.
the administratively-defined exemption of certain conduct (D-G) from enforcement may
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reflect the fact that of the legislatively prohibited conduct (D-W) the
conduct represented by D-G is characteristically engaged in by a
favored class. 9
11. The administrative decision to enforce N-S passively results in
the arrest of only a few of the many who engage in the forbidden
conduct.20
III. Although arrests will routinely be made for K-P, the
individual policeman has the power to exercise leniency if arrest seems
unduly harsh under the circumstances, and his judgment as to those
circumstances is likely to result in leniency in favor of those whom his
own prejudices favor.2'
IV. Passive enforcement of N-S allows the police to select
individuals for prosecution. Likewise, the availability of arrest for T-
W gives them discretionary authority-while nearly everyone engages
in conduct within this range, the police can arrest a disfavored
individual for ostensibly engaging in the proscribed conduct. 2
V. In situations H-J and Q-S the individual policeman's
discretion is not normally narrowed by departmental guidelines
setting forth considerations for him to weigh in deciding to arrest, to
give a warning, or to ignore the violation.23
eventually make the law desuetudenal as to that conduct; see Berry, Spirits of the Past-Coping
With Old Laws, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 24 (1966); and second, the police, as a practical matter, have
the power to arrest for conduct (X-Z) which is outside the scope of the legislative proscription,
and to testify that the conduct was within the legislative proscription. While police perjury may
be all too common, courts seldom take the word of the accused over that of the police. See
generally P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 10.
19. For example, poker games at gentlemen's clubs are thereby exempted from the reach of
a gambling statute.
20. For example, laws forbidding possession of marijuana are enforced only against a few
randomly-selected scapegoats.
21. For example, the son of the bank president is not arrested when stopped for drunken
driving.
22. For example, the owner of the shop where a radical newspaper is printed may be charged
with violation of an obscure building code provision.
23. For example, he can decide to arrest someone playing a harmonica in the park simply
because he finds him arrogant or does not like his long hair. For the leading example of
advocacy of this means of social control by a former United States Attorney General, see I.
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935). Paulsen, Civil Liberties and the Proposals
to Curb Organized Crime, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 699, 703 (1963), for similar views of Attorney
General Robert Kennedy. See also Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An
Appraisal oJ the Investigative Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. IND. & ComI. L.
REv. 657 (1965).
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With at least 350,000 individual policemen 24 throughout this
country, the fifth category undoubtedly accounts for the greatest
abuse. Because instances of discriminatory enforcement are of such
low visibility and are so difficult to prove, however, few are to be
found in the case reports. Consequently, it is in the area of Type V
discrimination that the insulation of individual policemen from
judicial scrutiny should be attacked. But adequate conceptual
weapons have not yet been forged. The ambition of this article,
therefore, is to assist in shaping those weapons by clarifying and
criticizing the related concepts underlying and arising from the other
four categories of discriminatory enforcement.
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has rarely been called upon to deal with issues
of discriminatory enforcement. The first and most important of the
cases it has decided was Yick Wo v. Hopkins.2 That case arose under
a San Francisco ordinance which required all laundrymen desiring to
continue business in wooden buildings to obtain the consent of a
board of supervisors, making operation without such consent a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment. Yick Wo, a laundry
operator, was imprisoned for operating without a license, and sought
a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the ordinance although
purporting to be a non-discriminatory regulation to prevent fire
hazards, by its own terms contained no safeguard against
discriminatory enforcement, and, in fact was enforced in a
discriminatory fashion against Chinese. He alleged that the
supervisors had withheld consent from all but one of the
approximately 240 Chinese operators while allowing all of the 80-odd
Caucasian operators to continue operating in wooden buildings.
Finding the ordinance unconstitutional both as applied and as written
insofar as it vested unbridled discretion in the board of supervisors,
the Court ordered Yick Wo released.
The Court found that the ordinance did not confer a limited
discretion but rather "a naked and arbitrary power to give or
withhold consent .. . [and] not confided to their discretion in the
legal sense of that term . . . . It is purely arbitrary, and
acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint." 6 Approving Yick
Wo's first contention, that the ordinance was void on its face, the
24. This approximation of the number of policemei. as of 1960. appears in Sax, Why)' It
Hurts to be Black and Blue. 4 ISSUES IN, CRI.MINOLOGY 1, 7 (1968).
25. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
26. Id. at 366-67.
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Court stated that "the very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself."'  Moreover, official action or non-action
could be premised upon bias, prejudice and other improper influences
that would be difficult to prove. 2
However, the Court found it unnecessary to base its decision on
the language of the ordinance which afforded opportunities for
'unequal and unjust discrimination in their administration." 29 Yick
Wo had also contended the ordinance was void as applied because a
disfavored class was punished while a favored class was permitted to
continue in business without any distinction of circumstances-unjust
and illegal discrimination-made possible by the ordinance. Finding
discriminatory administration of the ordinance, the Court uttered its
much-quoted observation: I
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered . . . with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal -discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution. -0
Federal and state cases following Yick Wo, however, have greatly
narrowed the application of its apparently broad-sweeping principles.
Subsequent cases introduced distinctions and problems of proof not
suggested by Yick Wo, thus indicating the power of an unsympathetic
court to eviscerate the Yick Wo remedy. In Crowley v. Christensen, 3
the Court, finding that the ordinance vested complete discretion in the
police chief, as in Yick Wo, noted that the police chief had good cause
to revoke Christensen's saloon license. Yick Wo was distinguished on
the further ground that an inherent difference between a "harmless"
laundry and the business of operating a saloon somehow rendered the
police chiefs exercise of unbridled discretion less obnoxious. 32 The
1905 case of Ah Sin v. Whitman3 introduced problems of proof and
pleading that have continued to plague petitioners. Following his
27. Id. at 370.
28. Id. at 373.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 373-74.
31. 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
32. Id. at 90-91.
33. 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
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conviction for violating an ordinance forbidding presence in a locked
room containing exposed gambling tables, Ah Sin sought a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that the ordinance was enforced solely
against Chinese. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the denial of
the writ finding that petitioner's allegation was insufficient for failure
to allege "that the conditions and practices to which the ordinance
was directed did not exist exclusively among the Chinese" and that
there were non-Chinese offenders against whom the ordinance was not
enforced.Y
In Oyler v. Boles35 the Court rejected the petitioners' claim that
their sentences to life imprisonment under West Virginia's habitual
criminal statute constituted discrimination violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The statute by its own terms was to be automatically
triggered upon conviction for a third felony; in fact, Oyler alleged, he
alone among six such offenders, was subjected to its provisions by the
Taylor County Court; and moreover, 904 persons throughout the
state had escaped its sanctions. The Court stressed that the record did
not exclude the possibility that the failure to proceed against other
three-time offenders was due to lack of knowledge of the prior
offenses on the part of the prosecutors concluding that "the
allegations set out no more than a failure to prosecute others because
of a lack of knowledge of their prior offenses."36 Thus the complaint
did not allege a denial of equal protection.
It is arguable whether Oyler stands precisely for the proposition
that essential to any claim of discriminatory enforcement is the
allegation that the enforcement agency is aware of the other violations
that it allegedly has failed to proceed against. If this is its principle, it
adds little to Ah Sin's requirement that the existence of other violators
be affirmatively pleaded. However, the Court indicated "the
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a
federal constitutional violation. . . . [unless the selection is] based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification. ' 37 This suggests that selectivity based upon a
34. Id. at 507. A suspicion that the Court had prejudged the ultimate question arises from its
observation that Yick Wo
concerned the use of property for lawful and legitimate purposes. [Ah Sin] is concerned
with gambling, to suppress it is recognized as a proper exercise of governmental
authority, [an exercise] which would have no incentive in race or class discrimination. Id.
35. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
36. Id. at 456.
37. Id.
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"justifiable standard" is always permissible. But Oyler is probably
not applicable to cases involving the exercise of such selectivity by
police, inasmuch as the discretion involved was that of the prosecutor
who, by tradition, has the very widest latitude in this area.3
Two tax assessment cases, involving property rights rather than
personal liberty, have been widely viewed as further limitihg Yick Wo.
In Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield 9 the Court rejected Sunday
Lake's claim that the assessment of its property at full value for tax
purposes while other companies were assessed at one-third their worth
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Noting that the State Board of Tax Assessors had neither the time to
re-assess the properties of the other companies nor sufficient evidence
to justify a summary adjustment, the Court introduced an element of
"good-faith" to uphold the action of the Board. Specifically, the
Court found that petitioner had failed to prove a lack of good faith
and held that "mere errors of judgment by officials will not support a
claim of discrimination. There must be something more-something
which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential
principle of practical uniformity."40 In the second tax assessment
case, Mackay Telegraph & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, ' the alleged
discrimination lay not in a differential rate, but in a failure-to enforce
a tax on telegraph poles against two competitor companies. The
Court reiterated the requirement that a petitioner allege "arbitrary
and intentionally unfair discrimination" and noted that the
enforcement of a telegraph pole tax against Mackay may have been a
test case to determine whether license fees might validly be imposed in
the circumstances "with [the] intent, in case of an affirmative answer,
to enforce the general ordinance against the other companies. '42
38. It should be observed, too, that the Court declined to decide whether the statute did in
fact impose the mandatory duty that the petitioners had alleged. Id.
39. 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
40. Id. at 353.
41. 250 U.S. 94 (1919).
42. Id. at 100. It should be noted that the Court was not entirely satisfied that the
circumstances of the two other companies were similar to the petitioners.
See also Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958), where the Court, in a per curiam
opinion, upheld the power of the FTC to issue a cease and desist order against one firm while
allowing that firm's competitors to persist in the same unfair trade practice. Two commentators
who would rely on Moog to give police the power to single out certain offenders for arrest,
Remington & Rosenblum 492; Remington, supra note 3, at 363, overlook the fact that the Court
deferred to the expertise of the Commission in its exercise of a discretion expressly conferred by
Congress. Congress had specifically empowered the Commission "to develop that enforcement
policy best calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its available
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Further pleading difficulties were imposed upon the plaintiff in the
civil rights case of Snowden v. Hughes.4 3 In the 1940 Republican
primary for nomination for the Illinois General Assembly, Snowden,
a Negro;44 placed second. Illinois election laws provided that the two
highest vote getters in the Republican primary and the one winner in
the Democratic primary were to be placed on the ballot in the general
election. Three representatives were to be elected from the district, and
thus Snowden's second-place finish in the Republican primary was
tantamount to election; however, the State Primary Canvassing
Board, in violation of state law, failed to certify Snowden, certifying
instead only the one highest vote-getter from both the Republican and
Democratic primaries. Snowden, deprived of election to office,
brought suit in federal district court against the members of the State
Board for $50,000 damages. 5 The Supreme Court in dismissing held
Snowden's pleadings inadequate for failure to allege "purposeful
discrimination." Where Sunday Lake held only that "something
more" must be shown than "mere errors of judgment," namely, the
"intentional violation of the essential principle of practical
uniformity," Snowden seemingly held that selective enforcement is
always permissible unless the victim can prove that he has been
intentionally singled out for personal victimization. The puzzling
aspect of Snowden is that the pleadings had alleged "willful" and
"malicious" discrimination 
-yet the Court dismissed these as mere
"'opprobrious epithets.""
In a Sunday closing case, Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley,47 the petitioners alleged that the prosecutor had
invidiously singled them out as his exclusive target. In declining to
enjoin their pending prosecutions, the Court dispelled any possible
funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and economically." 355
U.S. at 413. The narrowness of the decision is apparent in the Court's statement that deference
to the Commission in this instance "is but recognition of the fact that in the shaping of its
remedies within the framework of regulatory legislation, an agency is called upon to exercise its
specialized experienced judgment.'" Id.
43. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
44. The Court does not advert to Snowden's race. But see 32 Gho. L.J. 435 (1944).
45. The action was based on statutes now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981. 1983 ,, 1985(3)
(1964).
46. 321 U.S. at 10. Reliance on Snowden to defeat claims of discriminatory enforcement is
disquieting because Snowden. in all material aspects, has been deprived of its vitality by
subsequent cases. See Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167 (1961): Whirl v. Kern. 407 F.2d 781 (5th
Cir. 1969): Joseph v. Rowlen. 302 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968): Beauregard v. Wingard. 362 1-.2d
901 (9th Cir. 1966). Cohen v. Norris. 300 F.2d 24. 27-30 (9th Cir. 1962).
47. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
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doubt that the Yick Wo rationale is fully available to the defendant in
a discriminatory penal-law enforcement case by stressing that an
adequate remedy exists at law since the discrimination, if proved,
would be a sufficient defense to their pending criminal prosecution. 4
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT CASES IN STATE AND LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS
Type I: Cases in which enforcement officials immunize from arrest
and prosecution conduct (D-G) that is within the bounds
of the legislative proscription (D- W).
In this category fall those cases in which law enforcement officials
conceptualize the conduct of a subclass of violators as "different"
from that of others and prosecute one class while exempting the other.
One would expect the courts, in cases of this genre, to face squarely
the question whether police and prosecutors have the power to narrow
a legislative proscription in any situation and, if such selectivity is not
invalid per se, what standards are applicable in evaluating such
classifications. In practice, however, the courts have generally ignored
these questions and have considered such cases under an assumption
that a classification is valid if it is one that the legislature could validly
have made, even though the legislature itself did not see fit to make
it.49
A number of cases seem to be based upon this implicit,
unarticulated assumption. For example, in Gardner v. Benoite the
First Circuit rejected an argument that a decision of a state crime
commission to focus its investigations on corruption among state
officials violated the fourteenth amendment. While the discrimination
might deny equal protection under other circumstances, the court
found the classification served a valid state interest, concluding that
48. Id. at 588-89. The Court also noted that the need for an injunction had vanished during
the pendency of the litigation when the prosecutor's (who had threatened the discrimination)
term of office had expired.
49. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88-93 (1969).
Two cases suggest, that when the exercise of arbitrary discretion is facilitated by the legislation
under whose authority the discretionary act is performed, the legislation may be
unconstitutional, not only "as applied," but "on its face" as well, insofar as it facially confers
readily-abusable discretion. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 391 (E.D. La. 1963)
(three-judge court); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 880 (S.D. Ala. 1949) (three-judge court).
Thus, the appropriate remedy for discriminatory enforcement may, in some circumstances,
include a declaration that the substantive criminal law invoked is itself unconstitutional for the
discretion it contemplates.
50. 351 F.2d 846 (Ist Cir. 1965).
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"those appointed to high public office hold a special public trust; they
cannot properly complain if they are the objects of special scrutiny."'"
A similar rationale might justify decisions rejecting equal protection
claims in cases where prosecutors offer amnesty to all givers of bribes
who testify against receivers of bribes where the applicable statute
proscribes both giving and receiving; 52 or cases where landlords, but
not tenants, are prosecuted under a housing-repair law facially
applicable to both;5 and to prosecutions for blowing up a bridge in a
friendly foreign country while saboteurs against hostile nations are
not arrested. 5
However, connection between the classification and a valid state
interest becomes more attenuated as the propriety of classifications by
enforcement officials, who are not directly answerable to the
electorate nor charged with the making of policy, becomes more
questionable. For example, while it may be possible to discover a
reason to permit escrow clerks of banks to do what is forbidden to
real estate brokers, 55 or to permit gambling establishments
specializing in election bets to flourish while outlawing horse-race
betting, 6 one would anticipate that a court would not permit the
police to make such distinctions under a statute proscribing such
conduct generally. However, in each of these cases the court rejected
petitioner's claims, saying that the failure to prosecute some guilty
persons does not deny equal protection to guilty persons who are
prosecuted.57
The most familiar cases involving arrogation of legislative power
concern selective police enforcement of Sunday Blue Laws.5" The
51. Id. at 849.
52. Saunders v. Lowry, 58 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1932). The court based its decision, in part. on
the right-privilege distinction which it felt Ah Sin had imported into the Yick Wo doctrine. Thus
the vital difference is the one between "the right to use property for a lawful purpose and the
claim of a privilege to visit a gambling house which the state, in the exercise of its police power.
could suppress at pleasure.'" Id. at 159.
53. 300 West 154th Street Realty Co. v. Department of Bldgs., 30 App. Div. 2d 351, 292
N.Y.S.2d 25 (1968).
54. United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
55. People v. Sipper. 61 Cal. App. 2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (Super. Ct. 1943).
56. People v. Oreck, 74 Cal. App. 2d 215. 168 P.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1946).
57. Id. at 221. 168 P.2d at 191, People v. Sipper. 61 Cal. App. 2d 844, 848. 142 P.2d 960,
963 (Super. Ct. 1943).
58. The problem of attributing rational purpose to a pattern of enforcement that exempts
certain classes of establishments is especially confused in these cases because of the epic
generosity of the Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in finding
rationality in the exemption intricacies that were written into the law itself.
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lower courts have, for the most part, ignored the police arrogation
issue noting simply that no evidence established that other
businessman of the same sort as the person prosecuted had been
exempted from prosecution 9 and treating evidence that businesses
which, though of another sort, were equally covered by the law yet not
prosecuted, as irrelevant.10 Two cases,6 however, provoked thoughtful
dissent, the judge in one specifically noting that since the legislature
did not see fit to distinguish grocery stores from other mercantile
establishments, the administrative officers of the state are powerless
to inflict such discrimination by selective enforcement.6 2
However, three cases faced the issue squarely and reached a
logically justifiable result. A New York court has disapproved
enforcement of a building code and zoning ordinance solely against
non-parochial schools when it was facially applicable to parochial
schools as well.63 Similarly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
enjoined the selective enforcement of the state's Sunday closing law4
and a law forbidding the display of merchandise on the sidewalk. 5
The answer to the problems in Type I cases is obvious, but not
simple-the courts must establish meaningful standards to be used in
evaluating the validity of the criteria relied upon by police and
prosecutors to distinguish between subclasses of violators. As a
practical matter, the courts must recognize the power of the police to
narrow the legislative proscription by selective enforcement in some
cases-unless the police have the capacity to arrest and prosecute
every violator of a statute. The police must have discretion to select,
on reasonable grounds, those violators who are to be arrested. It is
suggested that the courts, rather than making the cursory inquiry
59. Highland Sales Corp. v. Vance, 244 Ind. 20, 186 N.E.2d 682 (1962); People v. Pam, 38
Misc. 2d 296, 238 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1963); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc.,
144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D. 1966).
60. In Bargain City USA, Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court, which had enjoined the Philadelphia
Police Commissioner from executing his announced policy of enforcing the Sunday closing law
against large retail establishments. The court, effectively re-writing Yick Wo, asserted "the
constitutionality of the statute cannot be governed by its enforcement unless the discrimination
in enforcment flows directly from a discrimination intended by the statute. ... Id. at 134,
179 A.2d at 443.
61. Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 226 Ark. 309, 313, 289 S.W.2d 679, 681 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Bauder, 188 Pa. Super. 424, 426, 145 A.2d 915, 925 (1958).
62. Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 226 Ark. 309, 316, 289 S.W.2d 679, 683 (1956).
63. Betty-June School, Inc. v. Young, 25 Misc. 2d 909, 201 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
64. Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).
65. Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040 (1933).
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whether the legislature could validly have made the distinction, place
the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate that the reasons for
viewing the various subclasses of violators as different are valid, the
classes of violators they have selected to prosecute are more "worthy"
of prosecution than those not arrested, and the classifications are
necessitated by administrative and prosecutorial factors. Further, the
prosecutor should be charged with establishing that the particular
defendant fits within the classification, is not being discriminated
against for other reasons, and that attempts are being made to
broaden the class of violators subject to prosecution. The burden on
the prosecution is, and should be, heavy. While it may be difficult for
the prosecution to rebut the allegation of unjustified discriminatory
enforcement, it is almost impossible for a defendant to affirmatively
prove the presence of invidious discrimination.
Type II: Cases in which enforcement officials' decision to enforce
certain conduct (N-S) only passively results in the arrest
of only a fraction of violators.
In cases in this category the law enforcement officials, rather than
claiming that the conduct of unprosecuted violators is conceptually
different from that of those who are prosecuted in Type I cases, assert
that total enforcement is impossible or impractical and that selective
enforcement is unobjectionable so long as the basis for selection is
neutral and not invidious. The most persuasive cases of this nature are
those involving situations where enforcement agencies lack the
resources to detect and prosecute all violators66 or cases where a
prosecution simply happens to be the first such brought," perhaps
even as a test case,6 8 and nothing suggests that other prosecutions will
not follow-especially when the first person prosecuted is a notorious
and egregious offender. 9 Courts have given blanket approval in these
types of cases.
66. Thompson v. Spear, 91 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1937): Powers v. Floersheim, 256 Cal. App.
2d 223.63 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1967).
67. Ehrlich v. McConnell. 214 Cal. App. 2d 280. 29 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1963); San
Francisco v. Burton. 201 Cal. App. 2d 749. 20 Cal. Rptr. 378 (Ct. App. 1962), People v.
Gordon. 105 Cal. App. 2d 711. 234 P.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1951); see Boynton v. Fox West Coast
Theatres Corp.,.6.0 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1932).
68. People v. Gorlo'n, 105 Cal. App. 2d 711. 722. 234 P.2d 287. 294 (Ct. App. 1951).
69. Powers v. Floersheim. 256 Cal. App. 2d 223, 63 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1967);
Highland Sales Corp. v. Vance. 244 Ind. 20. 186 N.E.2d 682 (1962) cf Takata v. Los Angeles,
184 Cal. App. 2d 154. 7 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1960): People v. Pope, 168 Cal. App. 2d 666,
336 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1959); State v. Sage Stores Co.. 157 Kan. 404. 141 P.2d 655 (1943).
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However, a number of courts have simply invoked the overly-
broad shibboleth that "laxity" in enforcement is not sufficient to
amount to a denial of equal protection. 70 "Laxity" is a description,
not a reason; such shallow reasoning neither provides a justification
for selective enforcement, nor rebuts inferences of invidiousness that
might be drawn from the selection of a particular victim. In effect, the
cases that simply invoke the "laxity" shibboleth are no better
reasoned than the cases that flatly announce their conclusion with no
pretense of affirmative justification.7 '
The problems inherent in a facile judicial rejection of arguments
against selective enforcement are strikingly illustrated by the
enforcement of a Sunday closing law in South Euclid v. Bondy.72 In
Bondy, although there were 15 competitive stores within view of
Bondy's store, he was the first arrested under the new law. The court,
not unexpectedly, rejected Bondy's petition on the grounds that
someone must always be the first to be prosecuted. However, one year
later Bondy again petitioned the court for relief,73 pointing out that
while none of his competitors had yet been prosecuted, he had been
arrested three times. Bondy was nevertheless again denied relief
because he was unable to show intentional discrimination. While
noting that "Bondy has not merely been prosecuted ...he is being
persecuted [and] [t]his is a shameful thing to be happening in our
great democracy," ' 7 the court affirmed Bondy's conviction.
Disadvantage to the persons selectively prosecuted is not confined to
economic competition cases. The person who is arrested for a
victimless crime such as possession of marijuana is a scapegoat. The
70. Nelson v. State. 387 P.2d 933 (Alaska 1964) (laxity in applying prescribed standards in
Fish and Game Board hearing for the wrongful taking of a cub grizzly bear); Ratkovich v. San
Bruno, 245 Cal. App. 2d 870, 54 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1966) (laxity in billing large trucks for
use of city streets); Yanke v. State Dep't of Pub. Health, 162 Cal. App. 2d 600, 328 P.2d 556
(Ct. App. 1958) (laxity in licensing convalescent homes); People v. Millstein, 54 Misc. 2d 651,
283 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Long Beach City Ct. 1967) (laxity in enforcing zoning ordinances); State v.
Gamble Skogmo. Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D. 1966) (laxity in enforcing Sunday closing law).
71. See People v. Linden. 204 Cal. App. 2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1962); Atherton
v. Templeton. 198 Cal. App. 146, 17 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Ct. App. 1961), Midwest Inv. Co. v.
Chariton. 248 Iowa 407, 80 N.W.2d 906 (1957); Garrison v. Menendez, 158 So. 2d 856 (La. Ct.
App. 1964): People v. Freidman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950); People v. Derison, 57
Misc. 2d 1003. 294 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Long Beach City Ct. 1968).
72. 26 Ohio Op. 2d 69. 92 Ohio L. Abs. 108. 192 N.E.2d 139 (South Euclid Mun. Ct. 1963).
73. South Euclid v. Bondy, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 296, 200 N.E.2d 508
(South Euclid Mun. Ct. 1964).
74. Id. at 320. 95 Ohio L. Abs. at 304, 200 N.E.2d at 512-13.
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failure to enforce the law against the vast majority of violators
relegates the occasional victim to a solitary doom.75
In only one case, United States v. Dawson,76 has a court been
sympathetic to the assertion that a mere showing of other
unprosecuted violators can be sufficient to constitute a denial of equal
protection 77 and that not even an allegation of intentional
discrimination is needed to support an equal protection claim.7" In
Dawson, the Second Circuit implied that a political leader prosecuted
for violating tax laws could establish a denial of equal protection
under Yick Wo merely by showing that other political leaders who
had similarly diverted political funds had not been prosecuted.
75. An additional deficiency in the judicial treatment of selective enforcement cases is the
occasional tendency toward duplicity. Courts are not always able to resist the temptation of
slapping on the "'selective enforcement" label, ignoring the presence of allegations of invidious
discrimination. In Moss v. Hornig, 214 F. Supp. 324 (D. Conn. 1962), the court dismissed a suit
seeking to enjoin a pending prosecution for violation of a Sunday closing law. The court
repeated the familiar incantation that the failure to prosecute others does not make out an equal
protection claim, and swept aside the plaintiff's assertion that the Chamber of Commerce had
used the enforcement against him as "a weapon of economic pressure" with the off-handed
remark that he had failed to claim a connection between the Chamber of Commerce and the
prosecution. Id. at 332. In Buxbom v. Riverside, 29 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Cal. 1939), the court
rejected a complaint for failure to allege arbitrary discrimination even though the plaintiff had
alleged that a competitor had been openly and continuously violating the same law, that the
defendants knew of the violation, and that they knowingly and wilfully had refused to prosecute
him. See also Hickinbotham v. State, 227 Ark. 1032, 303 S.W.2d 565 (1957).
More straightforward, though equally obstructionistic, are those courts which deny that
discriminatory enforcement can ever amount to a deprivation of equal protection. See State v.
Haase, 97 Ohio App. 377, 116 N.E.2d 224 (1953) ("The fact that one person is prosecuted and
another is not, is a subject with which the court cannot deal." Id. at 389, 116 N.E.2d at 230);
State v. Corologos, 101 Vt. 300, 143 A. 284 (1928) ("[ilt was a discrimination in the
administration of the law and not in the law itself, and manifestly had no bearing on the question
of respondents' guilt or innocence. One offender cannot excuse his conduct by showing that
someone else equally guilty has not been prosecuted." Id. at 307, 143 A. at 287-88). See also
Eastwood Park Amusement Co. v. Mayor, 325 Mich. 60. 38 N.W.2d 77 (1949).
For the suggestion that the defendant be given the status of "private attorney-general" to
raise the public policy issues raised by selective enforcement, see Remington & Rosenblum 498.
76. 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
77. In New Orleans v. Levy, 233 La. 844, 98 So. 2d 210 (1957), the court reversed a lower
court decree which had ordered the defendant to remove an awning that violated a zoning
ordinance. The court stated that Levy, the first person whom the city had ever hauled into court
for an injunction without previously seeking administrative compliance, made out a prima facie
case of discrimination when he proved the existence of many unrestrained violators.
"'Thereupon, the burden of going forward with the evidence, to explain its apparently
discriminatory conduct shifted to the city." Id. at 854, 98 So. 2d at 213. However, on rehearing,
id. at 862, 98 So. 2d at 217, the court retreated, and reinterpreted its earlier decision as a mere
denial of equitable relief to a city which had come into court with unclean hands. The court
expressly renounced any suggestion that a mere showing of other unprosecuted violators, absent
a showing of invidious discrimination, is sufficient to establish denial of equal protection.
78. 400 F.2d at 204.
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Here, as in Type I cases, a means of avoiding inequities that might
arise from selective enforcement premised upon impossibility or
impracticality is placing the burden upon the prosecution of rebutting
the defendant's allegation of invidious discrimination. With only one
case supporting an equal protection claim that did not allege
intentional discrimination, it is unrealistic-and probably
unnecessary-to expect the courts to drop the requirement of an
intentional discrimination allegation. Without enlisting the entire
citizenry into the police corps there probably can never be enough
police to arrest and prosecute all violators of a given ordinance.
However, when a defendant alleges invidious discrimination and
presents a minimum of proof supporting his allegation, the burden of
establishing the neutrality of the selection should shift immediately to
the state. Further, evidence offered by the defendant showing the
numbers and types of individuals who have been prosecuted for
similar violations and those who have escaped prosecution should not
be dismissed as irrelevant.
Type III: Cases in which an individual policeman exercising
"leniency" fails to arrest the violator, although he
routinely arrests all other violators in similar cases
(K-P).
Type III cases differ from Type II cases, because in Type III
situations it is the failure to arrest that is extraordinary and the
discrimination results from the favoritism toward the person who is
not arrested. Admittedly, there is often a valid justification for a
policeman's failure to arrest a violator. The offense may be a minor
one and a warning may serve as the necessary deterrent, or the
circumstances of the offense might indicate that the violator is
justifiably unaware of his violation, or so innocent of mind that the
policeman concludes that arrest is unwarranted and unnecessary.
However, there is at least one case79 indicating the possibility of
79. There are several other cases involving "leniency" by prosecutors and judges. Involving
prosecutorial discretion, these cases have little analogical significance for police "leniency." Cf.
United States v. Rundle, 270 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (choice to not prosecute an admitted
perjurer so that he would be available to testify against defendant); People v. Maldanado, 240
Cal. App. 2d 812, 50 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1966) (refusal of a judge to dismiss complaint
against a Puerto Rican and a black defendant after he had dismissed an identical complaint
arising from the same incident for two white defendants); People v. Hess, 104 Cal. App. 2d 642,
234 P.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1951) (failure to prosecute other state officials engaged in the same
misconduct); State v. Jourdain, 225 La. 1030, 74 So. 2d 203 (1954) (failure to give narcotics
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abuse and the fate of a citizen who attempted to bring the
discrimination to light. In Application of Finn,80 Finn was stopped by
a policeman while driving at night, and charged with having only one
headlight and no light illuminating his license plate. Noticing that the
police car also had no light illuminating its license plate, Finn sought
to make a citizeh's arrest of the officer who had arrested him. At his
trial, Finn sought to subpoena the police chief and four policemen to
prove discriminatory enforcement. But the California Supreme
Court, relying on a Type II rationale, recited the shibboleth that
failure to arrest others equally guilty is no defense and found no error
in the trial court's refusal to issue the subpoena. 8' Finn was ultimately
one of the few unlucky citizens who have gone to jail for the charges
indicated.
Type III cases are, as indicated by the sparsity of cases, of very
low visibility. However, when a court is presented with allegations of
this type of favoritism, it should face the issue squarely and avoid the
stock answer that failure to arrest others equally guilty is no defense.
Instead, the court should determine if the state has a valid justification
for the favoritism alleged, and absent a showing of a valid
classification the defendant's equal protection claim should be a
complete defense. While the dismissal of charges against the
defendant may seem harsh, it is submitted that the deterrent effect of
dismissal upon future police misconduct justifies the result.
Type I V. Cases in which the person arrested for engaging in'conduct
normally only passively enforced, alleges that he has been
invidiously singled out (N- W).
Cases in this category, involving the allegation of invidious
discrimination, have evoked the judicial requirement, disastrous in all
but a few cases, that the claimant allege and prove "intentional or
purposeful discrimination." It is within this category that one finds
some of the most outrageous examples of judicial abdication.
The most disturbing cases involve courts who give lip service to the
"intent" requirement, but whose decisions belie their apparent
conviction that discriminatory enforcement can never amount to a
defendant the opportunity given others to become an informer); Sherman v. State, 234 Miss.
775, 108 So. 2d 205 (1959) (failure to give embezzlement defendant the opportunity given others
to make restitution).
80. 54 Cal. 2d 807, 356 P.2d 685.8 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1960).
81. Id. at 812. 356 P.2d at 688.8 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
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denial of equal protection-some cases withhold even lip service and
dismiss equal protection claims summarily.82 These latter cases at
least have the virtue of candor in that they do not pretend that there is
a quantum of proof of invidious intent that would persuade them to
accept equal protection claims. The Florida Supreme Court has
stated that even if the record had proved that the defendant had been
the victim of "inordinate prejudice" that fact would not be material;8
82. The rationales offered to distinguish the Yick Wo doctrine are thoroughly discredited in
The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enjorcement. The arguments typically resorted to may fairly
be paraphrased as follows: one, Yick Wo only requires that persons engaged in a lawful
occupation be free from discriminatory enforcement of laws regulating that occupation. Persons
who violate laws have no right to do so, and have no claim to non-discriminatory enforcement.
See People v. Flanders, 140 Cal. App. 2d 765, 296 P.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1956); People v. Darcy, 59
Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1943); People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342
P.2d 538 (App. Dep't 1959). But see The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement 1107-12;
two, as a matter of public policy, persons who admittedly have violated the law should not be
exonerated simply because other violators have not been prosecuted--even if their selection was
discriminatory. See People v. Flanders, 140 Cal. App. 2d 765, 296 P.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1956);
People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342 P.2d 538 (App. Dep't 1959). But see The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement 1107-12; three, the ordinances in Yick Wo delegated discretion
to the administrative officials. Police, on the contrary, have no delegated discretion. See Society
of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949). But see The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement 1107-08 n.17, 1111 n.42; and four, the ordinances in Yick Wo
were intentionally drafted so as to facilitate discrimination. Therefore, Yick Wo does not apply
to discriminatory enforcement that was not contemplated by the law. See Bargain City USA,
Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962); Commonwealth v. Bauder, 188 Pa. Super.
424, 145 A.2d 915 (1958) (both Type I cases). But see The Right to Nondiscriminatory
Enforcement 1108 n.17, 1111 n.42.
In addition, two courts have refused injunctive relief as a remedy, relying on the now-quaint
doctrine that equity protects only property rights. See Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park Dist.,
366 III. 474, 9 N.E.2d 213 (1937); Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36
N.W.2d 308 (1949). But see The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement 1134-36. The same
opinions also warned that injunctive relief against discriminatory enforcement would
impermissibly nullify the substantive law entirely. But see Covington v. Gausephol, 250 Ky. 321,
62 S.W.2d 1040 (1933) (injunction expressly limited to bar only discriminatory enforcement).
Society of Good Neighbors denied relief for the additional reason that the plaintiff, being a law
violator, lacked clean hands. Cf New Orleans v. Levy, 233 La. 844, 98 So. 2d 210 (1957). But
see Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Ky. 1966).
83. United States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (court ignored the
allegation that defendant was singled out for tax prosecution because he was reputed to be a
gangster, treating the case as a Type If non-invidious selective enforcement case); People v.
Flanders, 140 Cal: App. 2d 765, 296 P.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1956); People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App.
2d 876, 342 P.2d 538 (App. Dep't 1959) (courts ignored allegations of discrimi-
nation-including racial discrimination-in enforcement of gambling laws, declaring that
discriminatory enforcement is never a judicially-cognizable claim, except where the offense
charged is malumprohibitum).
84. Creash v. State. 131 Fla. 11.. 121. 179 So. 149, 153 (1938).
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and other courts have dismissed petitioners' claims on the most
questionable case authority.8 5
However, the more offensive cases are those in which the courts,
although purporting to base their decision on an insufficiency of
proof, actually reject the Yick Wo doctrine as fully as the cases just
discussed. In one case, "6 a black owned and operated taxi company
had alleged that an ordinance prohibiting the taking on of additional
passengers was enforced only against itself and not against white cab
companies and drivers. Affirming the lower court's refusal to enjoin
prosecution for violation of that ordinance, the Illinois Supreme
Court indicated that "[wihile it is charged that white drivers have
violated the ordinance, no single, specific instance is cited, nor is any
company or person named." 8 However, the rest of the opinion leaves
no doubt that the court would have reached the same result even if
specific instances had been cited and non-molested violators had been
named. "Equity concerns itself only with property rights and will not
intervene for the purpose of restraining the enforcement of a criminal
statute . . even though the acts of the police department may be
performed in an oppressive and unlawful way."88 Similarly, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court 9 affirmed the conviction of a
Democratic candidate for mayor for the use of a sound truck without
a permit. After declaring that the defendant had failed to prove
discriminatory enforcement, the court continued:
Even if the Salvation Army, various churches and charitable organizations did
violate this ordinance therefore, such fact would not aid [the defendant] for he
clearly violated this ordinance and the [equal protection] defense . . . cannot
avail [him] . . .[nor would it matter] that the police in arresting [him] and in
not arresting others were improperly motivated .... 90
There are, however, a number of cases in which courts have
entertained the petitioners' allegations of discrimination. Of these,
eight are procedural 9 and six are decisions on the merits. 2 The
85. Cone v. State, 184 Ga. 316, 324, 191 S.E. 250, 255 (1937): Bailleaux v. Gladden. 230
Ore. 606, 611, 370 P.2d 722, 724 (1962).
86. Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 366 111.474.9 N.E.2d 213 (1937).
87. Id. at 479, 9 N.E.2d at 216.
88. Id.
89. Commonwealth v. Winfree. 408 Pa. 128. 182 A.2d 698 (1962).
90. Id. at 139. 182 A.2d at 704.
91. People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Ct. App. 1967): Wade v. San
Francisco. 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1947); People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App.
2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (App. Dep't 1960); People v. Amdur. 123 Cal. App. 2d 951. 267 P.2d
445 (App. Dep't 1954); Di Maggio v. Brown. 19 N.Y.2d 283. 225 N.E.2d 871. 279 N.Y.S.2d
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procedural decisions involve determinations that particular evidence
was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory
enforcement if the proferred evidence, upon retrial, supports the
allegations. In one case" the court held that even conclusory
allegations of discriminatory enforcement and intent were sufficient
to entitle the petitioner to an opportunity to present his proof.
Although a New York decision seems to be equally sympathetic, 9 the
remaining six cases required a somewhat more complete allegation
and offering of evidence of discriminatory enforcement and intent,
and that burden being met, directed a trial on the merits.
While these cases facially give the impression that a legal remedy
is finally available to persons unfairly singled out for arrest and
prosecution, a closer look discloses that even in these courts the
remedy may be illusory. True, the claimant is given an opportunity to
present evidence in support of his claim, but he has the burden of
persuasion, the quantum of proof required is a heavy one, and an
essential element that must be proved is the invidious intent of
enforcement officials. Nowhere in these cases can one find a reasoned
explanation for placing upon a criminal defendant the burden of
persuasion as to his claim of discriminatory enforcement. The closest
approximation is that:
As to the conventional affirmative defenses in a criminal case, the burden is
161 (1967); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 777, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964); People
v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962); People v. Solkoff, 53
Misc. 2d 137, 278 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Long Beach City Ct. 1967). Of these, all but two are
determinations that a lower court erred in excluding proferred evidence supportive of a claim of
discriminatory enforcement. The court in Gray reversed because the lower court had erroneously
instructed the jury as to the defendant's burden of proof to establish his claim; Solkoff is a ruling
of the trial judge granting a motion for a preliminary hearing on the claim.
See also Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (rejecting the
government's contention that prosecutorial discrimination is not subject to an equal protection
claim); United Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Maloney, 127 Cal. App. 2d 155, 273 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.
1954) (reversing injunction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but approving in
principle the equal protection claim).
92. The claim was upheld in People v. Walker, 50 Misc. 2d 751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. T.
1966); People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City Ct. 1965);
Fairlawn v. Fuller, 8 Ohio Misc. 266, 221 N.E.2d 851 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1966). The claim was
rejected in Mangold Midwest Co. v. Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 143 N.W.2d 813 (1966); People
v. Paine Drug Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 156, 254 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 838
(1965); People v. Solkoff, 53 Misc. 2d 893, 280 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Long Beach City Ct. 1967).
93. Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1947). Wade,
arrested under an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of magazine subscriptions on the sidewalk,
alleging that the police, knowing of other violators, had refrained from enforcing the ordinance
against them. and had enforced it against him with discriminatory intent, sought an injunction
against his prosecution.
94. People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901,200 N.E.2d 777, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964).
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upon the defendant to come forward with some evidence making the defense
one of the issues in the case but the burden of proof remains upon the People
upon the whole case to establish the invalidity of the defenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is the settled law as to the defense of self-defense and the
defense of insanity . . . .[as to the claim of discriminatory enforcement] as a
matter of sound principle, the burden should be upon the defendant, if he
claims that there was intentional discrimination, to establish it by a clear
preponderance of the proof.95
Nor do the cases intelligently rationalize the quantum of proof
required. One court chose the "clear preponderance" standard and
referred to the defendant's "heavy burden."9" Subsequent cases have
either cited it without discussion, or have failed even to advert to the
question. One exception is People v. Gray,97 where the sole ground for
reversal was the trial court's jury instruction that the defendant had to
establish discriminatory enforcement "by clear and convincing
proof." Holding that the defendant's "heavy burden," properly
construed, amounts to no more than a mere preponderance, the court
said that to hold otherwise "is to hold that equal protection may be
denied if the denial cannot be clearly and convincingly proved. We
doubt that the fourteenth amendment sanctions so cynical a posture."
Reasoning that access to the facts pertinent to a particular defense is a
crucial consideration in allocating the burden of proof, the court
suggested that it might also be considered in determining the
necessary quantum. Because "[e]vidence of discriminatory
enforcement usually lies buried in the consciences and files of the law
enforcement agencies . . . .the imposition of a burden heavier than
proof by a preponderance of the evidence might mean the nullification
of the defense as a practical matter.""8 Unfortunately the court did
not pursue its reasoning further and remove the burden of persuasion
from the defendant.
An examination of the cases decided on the merits justifies one's
apprehensions about the unexplained and undefined burden of proof
in instances of allegedly invidious selective prosecution. In Mangold
Midwest Co. v. Richfield 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court was
unwilling to say that the trial court was clearly wrong in finding no
purposeful discrimination in enforcement of a Sunday closing
95. People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.. 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 18. 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (1962).
96. Id. at 18. 225 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36.
97. 254 Cal. App. 2d 256.63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Ct. App. 1967).
98. Id. at 266.63 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
99. 274 Minn. 347. 143 N.W.2d 813 (1966).
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ordinance. Immediately following enactment of the ordinance, the
plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought a delcaratory judgment that it was
unconstitutional. For more than two years Mangold stayed closed on
Sundays despite the widespread violation of the ordinance by his
competitors. The plaintiff then had three of its employees make
Sunday purchases of restricted items from its law-violating
conpetitors, formally informed the city of the violations, and
complained of discriminatory enforcement. He then announced that
since his competitors were allowed to violate the law, he too would do
business on Sundays. On the following Sunday both the plaintiff and
two other stores were served with complaints by the police. The fact of
enforcement against the two other stores persuaded the trial court that
there was no purposeful discrimination against the plaintiff, despite
the testimony of the officer responsible for serving the complaints that
"he had been told by his supervisor to serve a couple of other stores so
that it would not look as if the village were discriminating against the
plaintiffs." 0
In another Sunday closing case, a -New York court, reaching an
equally bizarre result, reinstated an indictment after the trial court,
finding discriminatory enforcement, had dismissed the prosecution. 01
The trial court had found that the city made no efforts of.its own to
enforce the law and that the initiative for enforcement had come
wholly from the Retail Merchants Council whose complaints were
directed against the defendant-a discount drug store and formidable
competitor-for self-serving economic reasons rather than from a
basic desire for general enforcement. 02 Reversing on the basis that the
Yick Wo rationale is applicable only to discrimination by public
authorities, the court proclaimed that even if the Retail Merchants
Council's complaints had been inspired by the basest of motives, their
actions, being those of private persons, were beyond the reach of Yick
Wo. The court also deduced that the competitors' motives were not
solely economic, but in fact were highly moral-for they would be
forced to break the law themselves if discount drug stores continued to
do so, and it was this they wished to avoid. 03
100. Id. at 349, 143 N.W.2d at 815.
101. People v. Paine Drug Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 156, 254 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 838 (1965).
102. People v. Pain6 Drug Co., 39 Misc. 2d 853, 241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe County Ct.
1963).
103. In People v. Solkoff, 53 Misc. 2d 893, 280 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Long Beach City Ct. 1967),
the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the prosecution for violation of a zoning
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
In three cases the claim of discriminatory enforcement prevailed.
In a Sunday sales case, the trial court, after a preliminary hearing,
dismissed the prosecution." 4 The defendant was the operator of an
independent meat market who had recently refused to negotiate a
union contract; the complainant was a union official. The evidence
disclosed that the union regularly sought enforcement against non-
unionized markets as a means of compelling accession to a union
contract. Any protestation that the union was concerned simply with
obedience to the law was belied by the existence of a provision in their
contracts with unionized markets requiring a special pay scale for
Sunday employment! A New York appellate court reversed the
conviction of a landlord for violating the housing code."' The
evidence substantiated the defendant's allegation that the prosecution
had been instituted in retaliation for her exposure of corruption by
housing inspectors. While there was no evidence of widespread non-
enforcement against other violators, there was evidence that the time
allowed her for administrative compliance was so unreasonably short
as to preclude avoidance of prosecution. And, a trial court dismissed
Sunday closing law prosecutions upon evidence that the city had
effectively refused to prosecute anyone else but the employees of one
paiticular store.'10
TYPE V: A Concluding Postscript on Low- Visibility
Discrimination by Individual Policemen (H-J, Q-S).
Type V cases are essentially similar to Type IV cases, with the
additional difficulty that they involve discrimination at a much lower
level of visibility. There appear to be no reported cases involving
abuse of discretion to arrest by individual policemen.0 7
ordinance. The court was not persuaded that the defendant was the victim of discriminatory
enforcement despite a concession by the city that it had no general pattern of enforcement but
proceeded almost entirely on private complaints and with proof that the defendant was being
prosecuted for the third time whereas other violators were virtually immune from prosecution,
and had been denied the same opportunity for administrative compliance that other violators
customarily receive.
104. People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City Ct. 1965),
105. People v. Walker, 50 Misc. 2d 751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. T. 1966).
106. Fairlawn v. Fuller, 8 Ohio Misc. 266. 221 N.E.2d 851 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1966). The
case is remarkable in that it is fundamentally a Type II case; but the addition of the bare
allegation of intentional discrimination was held sufficient in itself to induce the court to infer
invidiousness from non-enforcement against other violators.
107. Since the analytic focus of this article is "pure" discriminatory enforcement, its scope
excludes cases in which discriminatory enforcement infringes on substantive freedoms. See, e.g.,
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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Certainly a policeman cannot be deprived of all discretion. 08 The
exigencies of police work are such that even the most elaborate set of
statutory or regulatory directives could not succeed in removing all
occasion for the exercise of judgment. The fact is, however, that far
from having elaborate sets of directives, the policeman is not given
even the most rudimentary guidelines." 9 Instead, the policeman is free
to use his discretion to oppress the poor, the Black, the culturally-
deviant, and the politically-activist minorities, often with society's
approval. The doctrine of Yick Wo may impose a theoretical
prohibition of Type V discrimination, but it is the peculiar genius of
our society to have both the doctrine and the discrimination. It is no
historical accident that Yick Wo has been either ignored by courts or
rendered useless by the overlay of need-to-prove intent and the
imposition of a heavy burden of proof.
Allegations of a denial of equal protection by selective
enforcement on the basis of racial prejudice, economic jealousy, or
other unjustified criteria are disquieting because they involve charges
of flagrant breaches of the public trust by the police. The courts, in
the discharge of their public trust, should be especially diligent in
ferreting out such discrimination and should, accordingly, lend a
receptive ear to such defenses. First, the courts must accept .the notion
that discriminatory enforcement can amount to a denial of equal
protection. Secondly, they must give more than lip service to their
recognition by relaxing the burden of proof imposed upon the
defendant. A minimum of proof should shift the burden to the state to
show the absence of invidiousness. Nowhere in the selective
enforcement field does the state have as great an advantage of
information in its files as in Type V cases, and it, not the defendant,
should be charged with the duty of producing the requisite evidence to
show absence of invidiousness vel non.
108. But cf. J. Goldstein.
109. See note 17 supra.

